The Pentagon and A.I. Giants Have a Weakness. Both Need China’s Batteries, Badly.

Washington — The United States is investing heavily in two pillars of future power: advanced military systems and artificial intelligence. Both are central to national security, economic growth, and global influence. Yet beneath the rhetoric of technological leadership lies a shared and uncomfortable reality. The Pentagon and America’s leading A.I. companies remain deeply dependent on batteries and battery components tied, directly or indirectly, to China.

This dependence is not theoretical. It is structural. And it is becoming harder to ignore.

Modern defense systems and A.I. infrastructure rely on energy storage at every level. Drones, satellites, submarines, mobile missile platforms, and soldier-worn equipment all depend on high-density, reliable batteries. So do data centers that power machine learning models, autonomous systems, and cloud computing. Lithium-ion batteries, and increasingly more advanced variants, are the quiet backbone of both military readiness and digital dominance.

China dominates this backbone.

Over the past two decades, Beijing has methodically built control over global battery supply chains. Chinese firms lead in the processing of lithium, cobalt, nickel, and graphite. They manufacture a majority of the world’s lithium-ion battery cells and control much of the refining capacity that turns raw materials into usable components. Even when batteries are assembled elsewhere, key inputs often originate in China.

For the Pentagon, this presents a strategic dilemma. U.S. defense planners have long focused on reducing dependence on foreign adversaries for critical technologies. Yet battery supply chains have lagged behind semiconductors and weapons systems in urgency and investment. Many defense platforms either use commercial battery technologies outright or rely on suppliers whose upstream dependencies run through China.

The challenge is compounded by scale. Military demand alone is not large enough to drive a fully independent battery ecosystem. Defense systems often piggyback on civilian technology, which is optimized for cost and volume, not geopolitical resilience. As a result, even classified or sensitive programs can be indirectly exposed to supply disruptions far beyond the Pentagon’s control.

The same vulnerability exists in the private sector, particularly among A.I. firms. Training and deploying large-scale artificial intelligence models requires enormous energy storage and power management. Data centers increasingly rely on advanced batteries for backup power, load balancing, and efficiency. Autonomous vehicles, robotics, and edge computing systems all require compact, high-performance batteries.

Despite their global reach and capital resources, most U.S. technology companies source battery components from a supply chain where China remains the dominant player. This dependence persists even as Washington tightens restrictions on Chinese access to advanced chips and computing technologies. Energy storage has remained the quieter, less regulated side of the equation.

Supporters of the current approach argue that diversification is underway. The United States and its allies are investing in domestic battery manufacturing, alternative suppliers, and recycling programs. New facilities are being built. Partnerships with countries such as Australia, Canada, and Chile are expanding access to raw materials. Over time, these efforts could reduce reliance on China.

But critics note that progress is slow and uneven. Building a resilient battery supply chain takes years, not months. Environmental permitting, workforce shortages, and high upfront costs continue to delay domestic projects. Meanwhile, Chinese firms benefit from scale, state support, and a deeply integrated industrial base that is difficult to replicate quickly.

There is also a strategic paradox at work. The same clean-energy transition policies driving battery demand for electric vehicles and renewable power are increasing pressure on already-constrained supply chains. As demand rises, competition for materials intensifies. Without sufficient domestic capacity, U.S. military and technology sectors may find themselves competing with global markets where China sets the terms.

From a national security perspective, the risk is not limited to shortages. Dependence creates leverage. In a crisis, supply disruptions—whether deliberate or incidental—could affect readiness, production timelines, and operational flexibility. Even the perception of vulnerability can shape strategic calculations.

Yet there are limits to alarmism. China, too, depends on global markets. Battery supply chains are interconnected, and abrupt decoupling would carry costs for all sides. Most experts agree that a sudden cutoff is unlikely. The greater concern lies in long-term exposure and gradual erosion of strategic autonomy.

The policy response so far reflects this balancing act. Rather than severing ties, Washington is attempting to reduce risk through diversification, incentives, and industrial policy. The Defense Department has begun mapping supply chains more rigorously. Federal funding is supporting domestic battery research and production. A.I. companies are exploring energy efficiency and alternative technologies.

Still, the gap between ambition and capability remains. Batteries lack the visibility of fighter jets or microchips, but their importance is no less real. Power, in both military and digital terms, ultimately depends on energy. And energy depends on materials, manufacturing, and supply chains that cannot be wished into existence.

The broader lesson is a familiar one. Technological leadership is not only about innovation at the frontier. It is also about control over the mundane but essential components that make advanced systems work. In that sense, batteries represent a test of whether the United States can align its strategic priorities with its industrial foundations.

For now, the Pentagon and A.I. giants continue to operate in a system shaped by Chinese dominance in battery production. Acknowledging that vulnerability is the first step. Addressing it will require patience, investment, and a willingness to treat energy storage as a matter of national strategy, not just commercial convenience.

The outcome will not be decided overnight. But the direction matters. In an era defined by competition without open conflict, resilience may prove as important as raw technological advantage.